	Case 1:14-cv-14176-ADB Document 152 Filed 05/10/16 Page 1 of 26	
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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS	
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4	STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS,) INC.,)	
5	Plaintiff,	
6)	
7	vs.) CA No. 14-14176-ADB)	
8	PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF) HARVARD COLLEGE, et al,) Defendants.)	
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11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JUDGE ALLISON D. BURROUGHS	
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13	STATUS CONFERENCE	
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16	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse Courtroom No. 17	
17	One Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210	
18	Friday, April 29, 2016 2:45 p.m.	
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21	Cheryl Dahlstrom, RMR, CRR	
22	Official Court Reporter John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse	
23	One Courthouse Way, Room 3510 Boston, MA 02210	
24	Mechanical Steno - Transcript by Computer	
25		

APPEARANCES:
ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF:
CONSOVOY, McCARTHY, PARK PLLC By: William S. Consovoy, Esq.
3033 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, Virginia 22201
CONSOVOY, McCARTHY, PARK PLLC By: Michael H. Park, Esq.
Three Columbus Circle New York, New York 10024
BURNS & LEVINSON LLP By: Paul M. Sanford, Esq.
One Citizens Plaza Providence, Rhode Island 02903
CONSOVOY, McCARTHY, PARK PLLC By: Patrick Strawbridge, Esq.
Ten Post Office Square Boston, Massachusetts 02109
ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS:
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE and DORR LLP By: Felicia H. Ellsworth, Esq. 60 State Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Also Present: Ara Gershengorn, Esq., Harvard Office Of General Counsel

PROCEEDINGS

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THE CLERK: This is Civil Action 14CV14176, Students

For Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard

College. Will counsel identify themselves for the record.

MR. CONSOVOY: Good afternoon, your Honor. William Consovoy, on behalf of Students For Fair Admissions, along with Paul Strawbridge, Paul Sanford, and Michael Park.

MS. ELLSWORTH: Good afternoon, your Honor. Felicia
Ellsworth on behalf of President and Fellows of Harvard
College. And with me is Ara Gershengorn, Office of General
Counsel.

THE COURT: Okay. I have the letters in front of me over the discovery dispute, and we'll get to that. Is there anything else we need to cover today just so that I know what we're doing?

MR. CONSOVOY: Your Honor, we'd like to cover post-Fisher. I think we're getting close now, and we think today would be a good day to make a plan for that given we may -- we'd like to think that the next thing we'll do is come back and see you after Fisher, so we'd like to talk about that at the appropriate opportunity.

THE COURT: Okay. It is one of those decisions that's not apt to be for/for. I guess that cannot possibly be for/for.

So at this judicial conference that I was just at,

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they had -- Erwin Chemerinsky and Paul Clement gave, like, a Supreme Court update. And they both gave a lot of predictions about a lot of cases and how they thought they would turn out and what it would mean for us all going forward. And when they got to Fisher, which they did cover, they basically said it's going -- there's seven justices participating. We know there's three on this side and three on this side. And it's really a jump ball what Kennedy is going to do. We'll all have to wait and see. So, happily, I did not travel to South Carolina specifically for that analysis. Ungratifying.

So we can talk about post-Fisher. I mean -- again, I'm happy to hear you on that. It would seem to make the most sense to me, is that Fisher comes out. We read it and then we get together a week later. I'm not -- I think it's difficult to actually make a plan post-Fisher when we -- sure.

MR. CONSOVOY: We agree. Our proposal was a procedural one, which would be to -- the parties would submit letters to the Court a week after -- simultaneous as to what they think Fisher means to the case and what the next steps should be so that we can come in when you're ready to see us, ready to make some decisions and, from our view, hopefully, move forward. And we'll see whether Harvard has a different view.

THE COURT: That seems reasonable to me.

MS. ELLSWORTH: I certainly agree that we can't

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comprehend anything before Fisher comes down. We don't have a problem with the idea of submitting letters and then setting a time to come in and talk about what makes sense assuming that Fisher doesn't do something that even changes that, but I find that hard to imagine.

THE COURT: I'm happy to do that. I start 13 weeks of trial on Monday, two cases, all with out-of-town lawyers. So I agreed to try the case 10 to 4 so that people didn't have to be away from their families for any longer than necessary. You know, we can definitely have a conference. It's just the scheduling is going to be a little Higley Pigley.

So why don't we do that. How much time do you want after Fisher to submit your letters?

MS. ELLSWORTH: I mean, I might ask for a little bit longer. I don't know. It depends on when it comes out and -- maybe ten days just to give everyone time to actually digest it. I don't anticipate it will be a guick read.

MR. CONSOVOY: Seven days will be sufficient for us.

MR. CONSOVOY: No objection here.

THE COURT: Why don't we just take a couple of weeks. I mean, my schedule is crazy, and it's -- we may as well take some time to do it. If it was at all possible for you to talk and maybe file one letter instead of two, that would be nice. But if you need to file the two letters, I can -- it's obviously fine.

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So why don't you take two weeks, and then let me know in those letters how much time you would like before we meet for a conference. If you wanted a week after the letters, that's fine. If you want a couple of weeks after the letters, that's fine, too. But why don't you put in the letters what you'd like for time, okay?

MR. CONSOVOY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: As I say, it's going to be early; it's going to be later; it's going to be lunch. So -- at least till July.

All right. So despite the fact that SFFA filed a single-spaced, 14-page document this morning, I've read all the paperwork that's come in. I have even read the cases. And I have to say, Miss Ellsworth, that I think that SFFA has the better part of this argument. They have an organization with membership. It's not a nonmembership organization.

I'm happy to go through the requests sort of one at a time and discuss them, but I think that your request is overly broad given the legalities underlying associational standing.

MS. ELLSWORTH: Your Honor, I guess I'd like to address the idea of a membership organization first. I mean, certainly they call themselves a membership organization. I think the point of the standing test that we'd like to have discovery to determine whether we have an argument here is whether, in fact, they are a traditional membership

organization, to use the language of Mr. Consovoy's letter from this morning. Certainly a DCF membership is what has been considered by many courts as important to determine whether an organization actually really is standing in the shoes of its members. I don't think we have sufficient information to know that that's the case or not the case yet. We have very, very limited information that SFFA has produced today.

THE COURT: Again, we can go through these one at a time. I think that it's fair to require them, if they haven't already, to give you the number of members that they have. But my reading of the case law at least -- and I'm happy to have you point me to something else if you want -- but that, if they even have at least one member that has -- would have standing in his own right, that that's sufficient.

So I think -- you've given them 15 names, right? I think you're entitled to take a look at those 15 people; but if some or all of those people satisfy the *Hunt* criteria, I don't think you're entitled to get to the other 19,985 people or whatever it is they say they have. I do think you're entitled to the number because you're entitled to know if there are actual members and sort of to what extent. But I -- if it's a membership organization, it has members, I think it sort of ends the inquiry.

MS. ELLSWORTH: I guess I would respectfully disagree.
THE COURT: That's fine.

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MS. ELLSWORTH: The three prongs of the standard, the first is, yes, you have to have members who would have standing in their own right. We're not challenging that right now. We have been given names of individuals who do appear to have whatever criteria they would need.

It's the second Hunt factor, which is the germaneness factor, as to whether or not -- and germaneness is sort of an umbrella under which this question of whether it is, in fact, a bona fide membership organization falls. So whether or not they actually have meetings with their members, whether member input is taken into account in determining the direction of the organization. We've cited cases in the D.C. Circuit and others that indicate where, in fact, an organization conceived of an idea and then went out and found members to pursue that idea, that's not a bona fide membership organization entitled to pursue suit. And that is the prong of the Hunt factors that we are focusing on, at least in this dispute, and trying to find out, you know, what information is there.

I guess the other thing I would note is our requests are -- there are several requests -- one related to the actual list of members. And we asked for names, when they joined, address information. There are many other requests that relate to other documents that are not really addressed as thoroughly as Mr. Consovoy's letter that we think don't implicate some of the First Amendment arguments that are being made, and we don't

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agree that those arguments carry the day in the end after the entire analysis is undertaken.

But, for example, communications with members, we know of communications that exist that have not been produced to us. We provide an example as an exhibit to our letter.

Communications with members both as recruitment as well as communications once they are members.

THE COURT: But I just -- I don't understand how the communications or the recruitment efforts are relevant to the issue of associational standing.

MS. ELLSWORTH: They're relevant to a -- particularly communications from members to SFFA are relevant to the question of whether this is, in fact, a member-driven organization.

THE COURT: I think that when you have actual members -- so the Hunt factors are members that would have standing to sue in their own right. The interest it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose. I think that the organization's purpose is set forth in their 501(c)(3) filings and that if people join the -- it's like the ACLU, right? If you were suing the ACLU -- I mean, they had set forth the principles that they are interested in advancing. And then, you know, I don't think you would be entitled to get to who their individual membership was. The purposes are set forth in the organizational charter, so to speak, and that -- I don't

think that the case law affords you the right to challenge what they've set forth as their purpose.

MS. ELLSWORTH: It's not the purpose that we would seek to challenge. It's whether the purpose as a member is member driven. It's whether the members, in fact, participate at all in the direction of the organization.

THE COURT: I don't think it has to be -- I think that that -- you're talking about indicia of membership, and I think that goes to organizations that don't have actual members.

MS. ELLSWORTH: But, your Honor, I don't think it's sufficient to say we have members if those are not traditional members as has been recognized in cases in which associational standing is allowed. I mean, the idea of associational standing is that you're standing in the shoes of the members. You represent exactly their interests, not that an organization has some broader interests and then finds a member with a specific interest that it then uses to pursue that interest. We do think it's an important distinction and one that we're entitled to test on standing.

THE COURT: It's just not the way I read the cases.

completely understand what you're saying, but it seems like

those sort -- that sort of testing goes to an organization

that's sort of more of an advocacy umbrella sort of

organization. It doesn't actually have members at all.

Now, if you go through the 15 people that they've

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given you and it turns out that those people don't satisfy the *Hunt* criteria, then we're in a different posture. Maybe they come up with another 15 or they decide they're not really a membership organization. Then we look at it a different way.

But I think that under the *Hunt* factors we're -- which is, by the way, why I would let you have the total number of members, right? So if you get the number of members, you're allowed to look hard at some number of them. They say 15. I think that's fine. The interest it seeks is germane to the organization's purpose, which is set forth in their 501(c)(3) information. And these claims don't seem to require the participation of the individual -- the individual members.

I think in a case where you have members, unless real members, and I -- I think that does -- I don't think you get to test whether they're members or real members. I think that whole -- that whole indicia of membership thing comes up in those organizations that don't actually have any members at all.

I'm happy -- you can point me to a case, but, I mean, I've looked at them. You know, I just -- I don't see it. I don't see where the indicia of membership criteria are applied to an organization that has actual members.

MS. ELLSWORTH: So, your Honor, I mean, we certainly cited cases in our original letter. We received the filing from Mr. Consovoy at the same time you did, so I would like the

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opportunity to respond to that on this point specifically. It do think the cases that we've cited provide that, but we're happy to provide --

THE COURT: I looked at them today, and I didn't see it. I mean, I -- so if you want to respond to it, that's fine. I guess what I would like to do, just to sort of keep things moving, is to rule on this but give you the opportunity to move for reconsideration, if that's what you want to do, when you take a look at his cases.

MS. ELLSWORTH: Your Honor, may I just ask? We're looking for much more than just a list of members. I understand you've ordered them --

THE COURT: I'm thinking we'll go through them one at a time. Is that all right with you?

MR. CONSOVOY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I mean -- and I feel like there's -- requests for production of interrogatories that are referenced in your correspondence back and forth. I didn't focus on those at all. I only focused on the ones that seem to be open in your letter. So the first one was RFP 7, all current and former members, names, cities, addresses, start and end dates of their membership, and institutions of higher education that they applied to or plan to apply to or where they attend. And I think that what we just discussed covers that. So that -- to the extent that -- I guess it's your

1 motion to compel -- it's denied as to RFP 7. 8, you've raised issues as to 8(b), (c), and (f), all 2 documents relating to membership dues or other financial 3 contributions. I think that's only relevant to indicia of 4 5 membership, which doesn't go to an actual membership 6 organization. The same with participation in litigation and the same 7 with -- I take it that the communications with SFFA and its 8 9 officers goes to trying to determine what level of control the 10:41 10 members exert over the organization. Again, I think that's 11 only relevant where you're looking at the indicia of 12 membership. 13 So I am going -- again, if you want to respond to this 14 one specifically, you can. But it's my intention to deny your 15 motion to compel with respect to 8(b), (c), and (f). 16 MS. ELLSWORTH: I just wanted to clarify that 8(b), 17

MS. ELLSWORTH: I just wanted to clarify that 8(b),

(c), and (f) all relate to simply the members that have been specifically identified by SFFA as their "standing members."

So we're seeking communication of those identified individuals with SFFA and their funding or lack thereof of the organization.

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THE COURT: You want those only to apply to the 15?

MS. ELLSWORTH: That's all it asked for.

THE COURT: Sorry. I didn't realize that. So they're asking for -- in 8(b), they want to know that these 15 people

1 are actually members. Can you give them that documentation? MR. CONSOVOY: We have. We've given them their names 2 and basic information about them. Of course, for most of them, 3 they've already applied to Harvard. They have all of the 4 5 information that would go to their underlying claims. 6 THE COURT: How do they join this organization? 7 MR. CONSOVOY: Through our website, which is a standard procedure for --8 9 THE COURT: Is it a questionnaire with names -- they 10:43 10 just -- a name or you get -- what do you collect? 11 MR. CONSOVOY: Multiple options. So there's a basic 12 form and then a longer form for people who are interested in 13 potentially being a -- what we're calling standing members, 14 those who we're relying on. 15 THE COURT: Have you given them the forms that each of 16 those 15 people filled out? 17 MR. CONSOVOY: I don't think we have, your Honor. do consider those to be privileged communications, no different 18 19 than the NAACP with their voter ID plaintiffs, telling them 10:44 20 their story. Those are First Amendment privileged 2.1 communications. So we have not. But we've told them their 22 names, where they applied to and when they joined. And so they 23 can look at their own records and determine whether they've --24 the only thing relevant to standing, they have to be a member 25 of our organization, which they are; they have applied to

Harvard; they've been rejected; or they plan to apply to Harvard.

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THE COURT: Have you provided them with affidavit -- what have you given them to show that these 15 people are members?

MR. CONSOVOY: We've given them their names, and we've given an interrogatory answer from our president. At a later point in the case, if they deem it necessary, obviously, there will be -- you know, we'll submit a declaration, but we're not there yet.

MS. ELLSWORTH: This is the point in the case. This is the point in the case. If we depose them, we'd like to know, you know, when they joined, whatever information they provided, what communications they may have had with the -- if they're privileged -- if it's associational privilege, it's different. If there's a claim of attorney/client privilege, that's what privilege logs exist for. I think we're entitled to this information.

THE COURT: I don't see how there would be attorney/client privilege in an application to join -- in a form to join an organization.

I think that they're entitled to more than you've given them on the 15. All right? So if you're going to resist turning over the form that they've filled out on the website, either an affidavit saying that they are members, and that

should include when they joined.

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MR. CONSOVOY: We understand, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. All documents relating to the participation in litigation, I don't think you're entitled to that, or why would you think you were, I guess is a better question?

MS. ELLSWORTH: Well, again, your Honor, we'd like to understand what their role is in this organization. I understand your ruling on names of other individuals; but if we're to test -- the actual names we have is about five or six at this point. There are more people that have been identified as future applicants, but the people who have actually applied, it's five or six. So if we're going to test those individuals' standing in the manner your Honor has directed, I think we're entitled to know what role they play in the organization.

Certainly, we might seek that through deposition testimony, but I also think that there are documents that exist that are responsive -- well, to the extent that there are documents that exist that are responsive to the requests about these members, interactions with SFFA, both upon joining and as the litigation has gone forward, we think we're entitled to understand those and understand what the member's role is in the organization.

THE COURT: Okay. I think all that you're entitled to is to know whether or not they are members under the ${\it Hunt}$

1 factors. Did you want to say something or --2 MR. CONSOVOY: That's our position. 3 4 THE COURT: I just brilliantly summed it up for you? 5 MS. ELLSWORTH: Your Honor, whether they pay dues. 6 don't know whether these individual pay dues. The dues requirement is a late add to this organization. So whether 7 they have paid dues, something I think we're entitled to. 8 9 THE COURT: Why don't you include in the -- in (b), 10:50 10 the date they joined and whether or not they paid dues, okay? 11 MR. CONSOVOY: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: So (b) is -- we've discussed. 12 13 And (f), I just don't think you're entitled to denied. 14 communications. I think all -- I think all that you get is 1.5 whether or not they're members, and you can test whether or not 16 they're members, but the communications aren't relevant to 17 that. 18 10, documents sufficient to show SFFA's finances, I 19 don't think you're entitled to that. I'm happy to hear you on it. 10:50 20 2.1 MS. ELLSWORTH: What we're interested in, your Honor, 22 to the extent that we can narrow it, is understanding the 23 proportion of SFFA's finances that are provided by its members 24 versus the proportion that comes from sources other than 25 members. I think, again, it all relates to whether this is, in fact, a member-driven organization.

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I do understand your Honor's ruling. I'm not trying to challenge that right now. But I think we're entitled to understand a little bit more about this organization.

Just to give you a sense of what we have, your Honor, we have screenshots from their websites that we already had. We have amicus briefs and other things that we already had. We have their IRS application, bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, and a report that was publicly released on their website. I mean, we have very, very little information about this organization. I think, in order to actually test the standing, which we do intend to robustly do, we're entitled to more and we need more.

THE COURT: I understand why you want more. I'm not sure that you're entitled to it or that you need it. Okay.

MR. CONSOVOY: That sums it up.

THE COURT: So in terms of the finances, what I would be inclined to ask you to give them -- although, again, I'm happy to hear you on it -- is a -- however many members there are, what percentage of them pay dues versus which percentage are not paying.

MR. CONSOVOY: On an aggregate basis, as long as it isn't identifying an individual, we can do that.

THE COURT: Okay. I know it's not what you're asking for, but -- all right.

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11 is all documents relating to identification, recruitment, selection, and members and potential members. Again, I just don't see that as being relevant to the standing -- to the *Hunt* factors when you have a membership organization. MS. ELLSWORTH: I would be repeating myself to make the argument so --THE COURT: All right. So denied as to 11. 12, communications or correspondence between SFFA, its directors, officers, members, or other representatives, donors, financial supporters, relating to the litigation. Again, I don't see a membership organization. MS. ELLSWORTH: I mean, your Honor, I think it relates to whether the members fund the organization or not or whether it's the donors that are funding the organization. The donors don't have standing. It's only -- and not all of the members have standing. So the standing comes from now the 15 people who have been identified perhaps. THE COURT: I mean, the First Circuit case law says at least one. MS. ELLSWORTH: It's not a numerosity requirement. It's a participation. We've received the number 20,000. Another contemporaneous statement from Mr. Bloom says 400. I take the sworn interrogatories to be true. They're sworn under penalty of perjury. But there's -- it's a bit of a moving target.

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THE COURT: We have now -- what I have directed them to do is to give you the number of members and then separate out the numbers that are paying and not paying. And if she is confused about this, if it's not clear -- I sort of assume that membership is a clear thing. But if you -- have you communicated to her in some way or another how you define a member? Is it someone that's signed up?

MR. CONSOVOY: We can. We can amend our interrogatory to explain clearly why a proof of 415,000 is. The president went to California and met with students, and it grew in about three days.

THE COURT: Give her some explanation of what constitutes a member.

MR. CONSOVOY: Absolutely, your Honor.

MS. ELLSWORTH: Your Honor, the other point we would make -- and we pointed this out in our letter -- is that what is important to the standing and creates the membership as of the time the suit was instituted, not today. So that's the reason that we ask for dates of membership of the names. I understand you're taking a more aggregate approach. I'd like to explore whether there's a way to take a more aggregate approach on when people have joined so we understand.

THE COURT: How about that? Can you take the date you filed the lawsuit and give them the number of members before that and the number of members after that?

1 MR. CONSOVOY: I believe so, so long as -- again, I want to sort of generally preserve. If we come across a way 2 that we think starts identifying individuals, we may need to 3 come back and revisit it because, obviously, we grew and we 4 5 grew and we grew. So if I can make that one caveat now, I 6 don't see a problem. THE COURT: Okay. So you, of course, all know you're 7 free to come back. 8 9 MS. ELLSWORTH: At lunch or between --10:59 10 THE COURT: No one has been shy about that. But after 11 court the hours are virtually in the middle of -- all right. So denied on 12. 12 13 13, all communications or correspondence among or 14 between SFFA members -- SFFA and its members or potential 15 members, board of directors, or any other person relating to 16 the complaint of the litigation. I'm going to deny that unless -- I understand your position on it, but I'm going to deny it. 17 15, all right. 15 is all documents relating to 18 19 membership in SFFA, including, but not limited to, all 11:00 20 membership policies. Have you given them that? I guess 2.1 that's --22 MR. CONSOVOY: Yes, bylaws and Articles of 23 Incorporation. 24 THE COURT: Okay. All documents relating to rights members may have to elect or remove SFFA's leadership? 25

1 MR. CONSOVOY: Yes, given them.

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THE COURT: Participate in its decision-making or otherwise controlled conduct? I mean, I take this to be sort of bylaw information.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: This is just the litigator in me being --

THE COURT: I was wondering how long that was going to take.

MR. STRAWBRIDGE: Five minutes longer than it should have. The request is all documents relating to the -- to the extent that this is a request for the policies and the formal documentation that sets out members' rights, we have provided those documents. We've also provided some interrogatory responses that address this. We obviously have not provided every example of communications with members that might on some macro level relate to --

THE COURT: That's what I was limiting to that, the actual membership, bylaws, rules, that sort of thing.

MS. ELLSWORTH: Your Honor, if the 14 documents that have been produced are the documents on which they are going to rely for their standing and that's -- we're standing on that, that will be what it will be.

We know there are communications that go out to members about the litigation. One at least is the annual report. There may be others that are not -- I'm not talking

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about an individual email to an individual member. I'm talking about a blast to the membership saying, Here's what we're doing, X, Y, Z. We think we're entitled to that. We think we're entitled to know if members actually come to meetings, whether meetings are held at which members can attend. Again, I understand your ruling on names, if we could get that information without names. I think there's more here that we've asked for, certainly than what we've received, and I --

THE COURT: I mean, if they have bylaws that say,
We're going to meet once a year or we'll make -- I think you're
entitled to that, but I don't think you're entitled to actual
information about when meetings are held and how many people
show up and what got said at those meetings. Are there annual
reports?

MR. CONSOVOY: We've given them the annual report.

THE COURT: Thanks.

MS. ELLSWORTH: There's only one.

MR. CONSOVOY: We gave them one. But in terms of email communications, that's to the heart of what's relevant here, what the communication -- what the members talk about. Whether it's in mass form or individual form, it's what we talk about with each other.

THE COURT: But if there are -- I agree with you there; but if there are rules or policies that say we're going to meet this often for organizational structure-type things

like that, I'd like those produced to them if they haven't

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already been.
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                   MR. CONSOVOY: Yes, your Honor.
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                   THE COURT: And annual reports, sort of -- that you
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          don't -- not email blasts, not the communications but to the
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          extent there's annual reports.
                   MR. CONSOVOY: We understand and we'll comply.
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                   THE COURT: All right. And then the last one is the
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          interrogatory that I think we've already covered, right, by and
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          large?
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                   MR. CONSOVOY: I believe it's duplicative of things
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          we've already covered.
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                   THE COURT: I think it is, too.
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                   MR. CONSOVOY: Yeah.
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                   MS. ELLSWORTH: The interrogatory asks for a list of
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          members.
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                   THE COURT: Right. So I -- if you -- I sympathize
          with the fact that you just got it this morning. It was dense
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          and single-spaced. If you want to file it -- fashion it as a
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          motion for reconsideration or a letter for reconsideration.
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          Don't bother with a full motion practice. I'm happy to read
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          it. Don't bother responding unless I ask you to, okay? So
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          we'll just keep this moving.
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                   MS. ELLSWORTH: Understood, your Honor.
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                   MR. CONSOVOY: One last thing, to sort of apologize
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for the lateness of our filing. We did inform Harvard over a
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          week ago that it would be coming in today. So I want to make
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          sure --
                   THE COURT: This is literally my first day back from
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          this conference, and I scheduled --
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                   MR. CONSOVOY: We appreciate your indulgence, your
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          Honor.
                   THE COURT: No, no. You know, look, I will say about
     8
          this case, whether -- whoever wins or loses on the individual
     9
11:57 10
          points, your letters and the briefs are all a pleasure to read.
    11
          They're just all extremely well-done and clear and easy to
          understand and hit the relevant points. So, you know, as I
    12
    13
          say, if I had to try and squeeze something in today, I was more
    14
          than happy for it to be this because it's all well-done, but --
    15
          I'm not ascribing fault. I'm just proud of myself for getting
    16
          through it before 2:30.
    17
                   Anything else today?
    18
                   MR. CONSOVOY: Not with us, your Honor.
    19
                   MS. ELLSWORTH: Not for us, your Honor.
                   THE COURT: Okay. Okay. If you want to -- there's no
11:57 20
    21
          time limit on that. You can -- all right. Thanks, everyone.
    22
          Have a good weekend.
    23
           (Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m. the hearing concluded.)
    24
    25
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$C \ E \ R \ T \ I \ F \ I \ C \ A \ T \ E$

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter to
the best of my skill and ability.

12 /s/Cheryl Dahlstrom

13 Cheryl Dahlstrom, RMR, CRR

14 Official Court Reporter

16 Dated: May 9, 2016